Qatar intervening in northern Mali?

It is likely that ECOWASis preparing for amilitary interventionto regainnorthern Malifollowing the military coup of March 22, 2012that overthrew theregime of AmadouToumaniTouré. At the same time moreand more is being said aboutQatar's involvement inthis part of theSahel.  Taking advantage of thedual crisisafflicting thiscountry -Islamist groupshave benefited fromthe Tuareg rebellionto take controlof the northand amilitary coupoverthrewthe incumbent presidentin Bamako -the emirate could be engaged in advancing its pawns inthat territoryon a path towardsAfghanization.  A game whichif confirmedwould provequite dangerous.

Qatar's presence in Malihas been provedbutin a manner that remains unclear 

The presence ofQatarin Mali is already known, but it is difficult to argue from this that the emirateis tryingto changethepolitical and strategicsituation inone specific direction oranother.  However,despite lack of proof of Qatari involvementin supportingarmed fighters, there is some evidencethatthis might bethe case.

Firstly, Qatar already hasa network ofvariousfunding projects which include madrassas,religious schoolsand charitieswhich date from the1980s and 1990sin Mali,as in otherMuslim-majority countriesin Africa. Secondly, following an agreement between theQatariRed CrescentandRed CrossMaliheldin Doha inAugust,Qatariaidis presenton Malian soiltoactin solidarity withthe people of thenorth,particularly around the triangleofGao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Moreworryingly, and to be treated with caution, is information taken from Le Canard Enchaîné and reprinted by theFrench and international press to the effect that Qatar is helping to fund armed groups, and that the Qatari Special Forces are supporting certainrebel factionsin northern Maliby training theirrecruits (especially those of AnsarEd-Dine).  This informationcomes from arecent report by theFrenchDRM(Military Intelligence Directorateunder the Ministryof Defense).  However,the lack offirst-hand information, due inpartto the conflicton the ground,makes it difficult toassess theaccuracy of Qatari engagementin northern Maliandto put this report into perspective.

However,regardless of thedegree and intensity, the presence of Qatari forcesin Malihas been,and continues to be, a strategyused increasingly in Africa, especially since the Arab Spring.  The emiratebecame involvedin the financing ofpolitical parties such asthe Muslim Brotherhoodin Tunisiaand Egyptin 2011and2012, was involvedin mediationin Darfurwhich was heldin Sudan in2011 andengaged intheNATO coalitionthat foughtthe regime of MuammarGaddafiin 2011(similarly,Qatar hasalso fundedrebel fightersin Libya).  Besidesthe presence ofthe Qatari Red Crescenthumanitarian aid in Mali,one may speculate about other possible reasons fortheir presencein this partof the Sahel.

What are the interests of a Qatari presence in Mali?

If the assumptionof funding,eventraining andarmingIslamist groupsby Qatar forces in northern Maliisconfirmed,then it ispossible to drawseveral conclusions.

Firstly,this intervention would provide the emirate with a simple butrisky strategy to greatly increaseits influence inWest Africaandthe Sahel.  Indeed, Qatar could greatly increase its influencein themediationbetween the Malian government, ECOWAS, the northern rebels, and even France.  This would increaseits political clouton the continent, taking advantage, asit often does, of afavourable political environment.  In the case ofMali,it isa failed state with asuddenpower vacuumin the North,due bothto theTuareg rebellion in the North and the coupin the South.  Add to this,the fortuitous presencein the Sahel of many fighters together with the weaponsused inthe recent warin Libya , alongside the presencein the North of young andunemployedTuaregsopposed to the Malian state, and one can see how it might be possible to fund the rebels.

Using thiscombination offavourablefactors, the emirate can seea way to continue making its influence heavily felt in Africa, work also undertakenin Egypt,Libyaand Tunisia.  In this respect, as in the case ofQatari engagement in Syria, two factors are in common.  Firstly, after the success of the Libyan campaign, theemiratefeels confident in being ableto directly interveneabroadin apowerperspective.  In addition,as in Syria,the presence of theemiratein Mali,if itisreal, should be viewed inthe context of atwofold competition: firstwith Saudi Arabiato control the Sunni Islamic world, but also to strengthen the power struggle of Sunni Muslims against Shiite Muslims (because the axis Iran - Syria -Hezbollahremains strongwhile theShiain Iraqrises).

Another common point, butthis timewith Libya, is that Mali is seen as a potential owner of large reserves of natural gasand has a needforinfrastructuredevelopment; two areas in which Qatar specializes.  It could therefore,in the event ofgood relations with theleadersof an Islamic statein northern Mali,exploit thesubsoilrichin gold and uranium, and prospect the country’s oil and gas potential.

Finally,geographically, Mali is alsoan axis ofpenetration intoblack AfricaandWest Africa where Qatar is pursuingits influence throughthe purchase ofresources and agricultural land, as well as the funding of places of worship.

An intervention, if proved, which could turn against Qatar

The situation inMaliillustrates how theproblematic situation inthe Sahel arouses considerable concern because ofthe weakness of statesin the region andthe presence ofAQIM and otherjihadistfighters.  In addition,the war in Libyain 2011has worsened the situation, as evidenced by therecent assassination ofthe US ambassador in Benghazi, ChristopherStevens. InMali,thefragmentationof thestateisnotonlyduetointrinsicfactors (Tuareg rebellion, structural weaknessof thestate, democratic façade, poor development) but also the direct consequence of a poorlycontrolledLibyancrisis.

In this context the intervention of Qatar, should it prove as controversial as outlined,is veryunwelcomeand fourplayers couldtake umbrage: the United States, France, Algeria andthe African Union. French and Americanredeploymentin the regionisindeedcurrentlyin place totry to stopthe downward spiral ofnorthern Mali.  The United States is refocusingitssecurity efforts onNorth Africaandthe Sahel, especially after the assassination of itsambassadorand given the prospectof imminent withdrawals of military forcesin Iraq andAfghanistan.  France, the traditional powerin the region,has recently had several of its citizens taken hostage in Mali and are under pressure fromnumerouseconomic and political interests.  However,the United Statesand France havevery strong relationswithQatar, whichinthe case of Mali, unlike the Syrian intervention, could go againstwestern interests.  The United States and France couldmake Qatar understandtheir decision to intervene, yet wehave to wonder aboutthe scope of 'retaliation' possiblevis-à-vis an emiratethat is importanteconomically, politically andmilitarily tothe two countries.

Meanwhile,the African Unionis tryingto assert itselfas an influential political powerand wants toresolve conflictson its own soil, namely throughits regional organization, ECOWAS, who have amassed a force of more than 3,000 men.  If the strategyof Qatar isfinancing orarmingfightersin northern Mali,then thiscomplicatesthe African Union’s task.  However,its ability to actand to influencethe decisions ofQataris very low(exceptthroughthe EU orFrance).  Algeria,for its part,is particularlyconcerned bythe situation in northernMali.  On the surface, Qatari-Algerian relations are strong since the two countriesare 'brothers'. However, Algeria is monitoringthissituation very closelybecause itfearsan attempt to destabilizeits borders and even its own soil.  More generally,a Qatariinterventionin northern Mali wouldincrease Algeria’s animus against the emirate.  Despite recent agreements, the two countries oppose each other economically in their competition for gas exports, as well as politically (financing of the Muslim Brotherhood in North Africa by Qatar, which also hosts on its territory the former FIS leader Abassi Madani, is frowned upon by Algeria, as well as the fact that Qatar joined the NATO coalition in Libya while Algeria advocated non-interference).  In addition,MOJWA(the Movement for Jihad inWest Africa), which could be financedby the emirateof Qatar, holds sevenAlgerian diplomats (kidnappedin April 2012in northern Mali) hostage.  Algeria, besides being a regional power, istherefore akey statein theMaliancrisis but is reluctant to intervenebecause of its1,300km border withnorthern Maliin an areaextremelydifficult to control.  Doing so wouldindeed carry the risk of a newterrorstrikeon its soil,as happened inthe 1990s.

Algeria,like the UnitedStates and Francehas no interest inthe status quoin the Sahel, andif Qatarintervenes,these statescould potentially react.  However, given the regional situationthere is more for Qatarto gain than to lose from an interventionin northern Mali.  This of course istrue only ifthe United Statesand Franceput the problems of the Maliancrisisbefore theircommon interestswith Qatar,which are indeed numerous.